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Abstract—The Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) sector is fast-
expanding. Protection of real-time UAV applications against
malicious attacks has become an urgent problem that needs to
be solved. Denial-of-service (DoS) attack aims to exhaust system
resources and cause important tasks to miss deadlines. DoS
attack may be one of the common problems of UAV systems,
due to its simple implementation. In this paper, we present
a software framework that offers DoS attack-resilient control
for real-time UAV systems using containers: ContainerDrone.
The framework provides defense mechanisms for three critical
system resources: CPU, memory, and communication channel.
We restrict attacker’s access to CPU core set and utilization.
Memory bandwidth throttling limits attacker’s memory usage.
By simulating sensors and drivers in the container, a security
monitor constantly checks DoS attacks over communication
channels. Upon the detection of a security rule violation, the
framework switches to the safety controller to mitigate the attack.
We implemented a prototype quadcopter with commercially off-
the-shelf (COTS) hardware and open-source software. Our ex-
perimental results demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed
framework defending against various DoS attacks.
Index Terms—Cyber Physical System, Real-time System, De-
nial of Service attack, Linux Container, Simplex, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Systems, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
technologies has promised a booming industry that brings
novel UAV applications in civil, commercial, and military
sectors [1]. As a great example of a cyber-physical system
(CPS), modern UAVs are networked robots equipped with
capable communication channels, sophisticated sensor system
and software, which offers advanced functionalities, however,
it also exposes the UAV system to malicious attacks. With
UAVs being able to carry out more tasks, reported attacks
targeting UAVs [2], [3] have raised concerns about safety and
security of the UAVs due to their increased attacking surface.
A successful attack on UAVs may lead to disastrous property
damage or even loss of life. Guarding UAV systems against
malicious attacks is of great significance.
The Denial-of-service (DoS) attack which slows the ex-
change of information by sending superfluous requests has
become a significant problem for Internet communication [4].
It aims to deny the access of legitimate users to shared
services or resources to make a machine or network resource
*Bo Liu is now with NVIDIA Corporation, USA
unavailable [5], which can cause system overload and prevent
some or all legitimate requests from being fulfilled. Even a
temporary DoS attack can compromise the strong real-time
constraints of many unmanned control systems. Though some
UAVs might not be connected to the Internet, they might still
be the victim of the DoS attack as malicious code might
be hidden inside installed software seeking opportunities to
attack. Defending against internal DoS attack requires constant
monitoring of all processes running on the system and their
resource usage, which can add extra overhead to the system.
Using more powerful hardware can alleviate this issue, but
the compromise made in size, weight, and power consumption
makes this solution unsuitable for embedded real-time UAVs.
To address this security challenge and meet the real-time
requirement of UAVs, we present the ContainerDrone frame-
work, a container-based software framework that offers DoS
attack-resilient control for real-time UAVs. It provides two dis-
tinct control environments: a verified host control environment
that guarantees safety but offers only basic functionalities,
a potentially vulnerable container control environment that
provides optimized performance and advanced functionalities.
We protect three critical system resources: CPU, memory,
communication channel, using Linux cgroup, Docker [6] built-
in mechanism, MemGuard [7], and security monitoring.
Our paper makes the following contributions:
• We developed a novel DoS attack-resilient control frame-
work, ContainerDrone, for real-time UAV system using
containers. The host control environment is protected
against DoS attack from three perspectives: CPU, mem-
ory, and communication.
• We implemented the framework on a quadcopter with an
off-the-shelf multi-core embedded board and an autopilot
sensor board. The operating system and software used in
building this framework are all from open-source projects.
• We performed experiments to show the capabilities of the
framework and how different kinds of DoS attack can be
defended.
The structure of this paper is organized as the following:
Section II introduces the background knowledge of Docker
container and Simplex architecture. The detailed idea of the
proposed framework is discussed in Section III. In Section IV,
we describe the implementation of our prototype drone using
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the proposed framework. We presents our experiments and
results in Section V. The related work is discussed in Section
VI and finally Section VII summarizes this work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Containers
Container is a popular open-source technology that pro-
vides lightweight software isolation [8], [9]. In its core, it
is an abstraction of several features in Linux kernel. Control
Groups (cgroups) provides resource allocation, such as CPU
and memory. Namespace isolates processes so each has a
different view of the system. Other modules like SELinux
[10], AppArmor [11], Seccomp [12] provide container security
capabilities [13]. Instead of virtualizing an entire operating
system, containers provide only the bare minimum require-
ments for the application to run and multiple containers share
the host operating system kernel. On the host system, each
container is just a process running the application and nec-
essary dependencies. System isolation using containers leads
to less execution overhead, less memory usage, and reduced
footprint.
Compared with virtual machines, containers have several
advantages [6]:
• Lightweight: Containers share the host’s kernel while the
virtual machine needs a hypervisor to talk to the kernel
and the underlying hardware.
• Efficiency: The average size of a container is around tens
of MB while a VM easily exceeds GB. More containers
can run on the same machine at the same time than VMs
could which means the same computing resource may
generate more results using containers.
• Portability: Containers have developed over the years and
evolved from a Linux only application to be able to
run virtually anywhere: on Mac and Windows operating
system; on bare metal and public cloud. It greatly reduces
the effort for development and time for deployment.
B. Simplex Architecture
The Simplex architecture [14] is a software approach that
provides a reliable control system. Instead of trying to avoid
all possible faults, the core idea of Simplex is fault toler-
ance. As shown in figure 1, it is composed of a complex
controller, a safety controller, and a decision module. The
complex controller implements advanced functionalities and
provides optimized performance, but is potentially unverifiable
due to its complexity. The safety controller has only limited
performance but is robust thanks to its simplicity. It can be
exhaustively tested and verified to be safe. During runtime,
all necessary sensor data are sent to both controller and each
of the controllers computes their own actuator outputs. The
decision module uses a safety envelop to determine if any
safety violation occurs, and is responsible for deciding which
output should be used for the current situation. Under normal
execution, the outputs from the complex controller are used
as it can provide better performance. In the case of a fault or
attack, the decision module detects the violation and switches
to the safety controller to bring the system back to a safe and
controllable state.
Physical
system
Decision Logic
Safety
controller
Complex
controller
sensor
data
sensor
data
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commands
Fig. 1. The control and switching logic of the Simplex architecture
III. CONTAINERDRONE FRAMEWORK
The ContainerDrone provides defense against DoS attack by
protecting three critical resources: CPU, memory, and commu-
nication channel. The Simplex architecture is implemented to
provide attack-resilience.
A. System model
The system is composed of two separate control environ-
ments that offer different levels of performance and security
protection.
As the figure 2 shows, the container control environment
(CCE) corresponds to the container environment and the
complex controller inside it. The complex controller provides
optimized performance and advanced features like mission
planning and object avoidance. The software running inside
the CCE are usually provided by third-party developers, have
complex architectures and require constant updates. Their
features make it not practical to verify them and leave potential
vulnerabilities to attackers.
The host control environment (HCE) refers to the host OS
and the safety controller running on top of it. It is designed
for safety propose and should follow a simple design approach
such that they can be fully analyzed and proved. Advanced
features like collision avoidance will not be We assume the
host OS is a simple-structured RTOS that its reliability has
been verified, such as the seL4 micro-kernel [15]. We assume
all system processes running inside host OS is safe. The
safety controller runs a minimum set of modules that are
critical to the correct functioning of the UAVs. It can take
over the control from the CCE when the complex controller
fails due to a DoS attack and thus guarantee the safety of the
drone. A safety monitor runs on the host control environment
and keeps monitoring the output from both controllers. Upon
the detection of a security violation, the monitor changes
the output source from the complex controller to the safety
controller to prevent further damage.
B. Attacker model
Applications in CCE may be safe during initial setup, but the
attacker can embed malicious code in the unverified complex
controller and get inside through updates. Inside the CCE, the
adversary can launch a DoS attack against HCE by running
any necessary program. However, the attacker does not have
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Fig. 2. Simplex architecture
the capability to escape from the container. According to [13],
[16], Docker is secure in terms of isolation. We trust the
isolation provided by Docker as well as the hardware platform
and the HCE. The goal of the attacker is to use DoS attack
to affect the host control environment and make the drone
crash. In this paper, we do not consider physical component
failures, software failure caused by bugs and logical faults, or
any attacks other than DoS attacks.
C. CPU DoS Protection
For the protection of CPU resource, we utilize the Linux
kernel feature control group (cgroup) and Docker’s built-
in mechanism. We restrict CCE’s access to CPU from two
perspectives:
• CPU core number: Cgroup’s cpuset can bind the CCE to
a set of CPU cores. Docker will also limit all its child
processes to run on the assigned cpuset only.
• CPU utilization: Docker restricts the process’s ability
to raise their priority. When the real-time First in-first
out (FIFO) scheduling policies is used, a lower priority
process can only get CPU share when a high priority job
has finished. This prevents the processes in CCE to steal
CPU share from HCE.
D. Memory DoS protection
Although cgroup and Docker can limit memory node, and
memory size a container can use, a malicious application in
the container can still launch the DoS attack on the memory
bandwidth by intensive accessing a small amount of main
memory, as later demonstrated in the experiments.
We use MemGuard [7] to protect our system from the
memory bandwidth DoS attack. MemGuard is a Linux kernel
module that ensures each CPU core in the system does not
access the memory exceeding a certain rate. It uses the
performance counter provided by the hardware to detect the
number of memory access from each core for each MemGuard
period. Within a period, if the number of memory access
initiated from a core exceeds the budget, MemGuard will
restrict memory access from this core until the budget is
replenished in the next period. It has been used on DeepPicar
[17] to solve resource contention issue.
However, there are other resource monitoring and bounding
techniques, such as [18], [19], which can also be used for
memory DoS protection.
E. Communication DoS protection
The complex controller inside CCE needs sensor data and
user input commands to function correctly. However, it’s also
important to keep a strong separation between them for safety
purpose. This is achieved by requiring simulation control mode
in CCE and using security monitoring in HCE.
Simulation Control Mode: Sensors and actuators in
HCE are critical components that need to be protected from
the untrustworthy software running in CCE. We require the
complex controller to run in a simulation mode, where it does
not access any device file but receive all the necessary data
from the network interface. Feeder threads running in HCE
receives raw sensor data from device drivers and send them
to both controllers. This eliminates all possible sensor DoS
attack as no sensor device files exist in CCE.
Security Monitoring: The complex controller uses the
network interface to communicate with HCE. To protect the
HCE from potential network DoS attack, the network stack for
the two control environments are separated. The CCE lives in
a sandboxed network space where it does not have access to
the Internet and can only communicate with the HCE through
a specified interface. Iptables is used to limit communication
package rate of the network interfaces to reduce damage
caused by DoS attacks. A security monitor keeps monitoring
the outputs received from the interface and also the physical
state of the drone. Two security rules are enforced and upon
a violation, the monitor kills the receiving thread on the HCE
and switches to use the output from the safety controller.
• Receiving interval: The interval between two consecutive
output received by the HCE should not be longer than a
threshold. A long interval suggests the complex controller
may have failed.
• Attitude errors: The attitude (i.e., roll, pitch, and yaw)
errors should be bounded at all time. The attitude errors
reflect the drone’s physical state. Large errors suggest the
drone is in a dangerous state and might crash.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Hardware platform
The ContainerDrone is implemented on a prototype quad-
copter powered by a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B computer (RPi3B
for short) as shown in Figure 3. It is equipped with a quad-
core ARM Cortex A53 CPU running at a default frequency of
1.2GHz and has 1 GB of LPDDR2-900 SDRAM. Its small size
and lightweight make it a excellent fit for a UAV application.
On top of the RPi3B, we stack the Navio2 sensor hat from
Emlid [20]. It has two IMU chips, barometer and GNSS
receiver, and provides sensing for RPi3B to control the flight
control.
(a) Prototype drone (b) Navio2
Fig. 3. Prototype drone implemented with a Raspberry Pi 3 computer and a
Navio2 sensor board
B. Operating System
On RPi3B we use Linux 4.41 for the HCE. The kernel
has been real-time patched and integrated with driver for
Navio2. On top of it, we run the container software Docker,
a mature open source container platform, for CEE. Docker
wraps everything an application need, code, runtime, library,
etc. in a package called container image. In the container,
we run a Raspbian Jessie based Docker image provided by
Resin.io, available from Docker Hub. One of the four cores is
assigned exclusively for CCE use.
We use Docker’s port mapping to expose container ports to
host OS. Hairpin NAT is enabled so port mapping is achieved
only through modification of iptables rules, no port binding
or user proxy process is involved. This allows the host to
communicate with container through defined UDP ports. No
privilege flags are used in creating the container for CCE.
We choose Linux as the host OS and Raspbian Jessie
as the container image to minimize developing effort. It’s
recommended to use a verified OS for the host for security
concerns. As the framework runs in userspace, no kernel
level modification is required for neither host OS or container
image.
C. Autopilot
We use the PX4 [21] as the autopilot for both HCE and
CCE. PX4 is an open source autopilot first developed at ETH
Zurich and has now evolved into a large community project.
PX4 offers one code base for all type of vehicles, including
multi-copter, fixed-wing, and even ground vehicles. It supports
MAVLink, a very lightweight robotic messaging protocol, for
communication between Ground Control Station(GCS) and
onboard components. PX4 also uses a modular design. This
makes it easy to integrate additional functionality into the
existing code base.
Two kernel driver processes used by PX4 on HCE are
assigned with 90 FIFO scheduling priority while the safety
controller on HCE is assigned 20 FIFO priority. These priority
are chosen such that the kernel driver has the highest priority
in the system and the safety controller has a priority lower
than system interrupts (about 40 priority, assigned by Linux)
but higher than the other processes.
1 There is no existing autopilot hardware that work with any verified OS,
we use Linux as a proof of concept.
D. Communication between HCE and CCE
The HCE and CCE communicate through a network inter-
face. The CCE is configured to use a user-defined network
where it does not have Internet access and can only access
HCE through a dedicated docker0 interface. Sensor drivers
in the HCE forward new data to complex controller through
a UDP socket following the Mavlink protocol at the fixed
sampling rate. After the complex controller produces the
actuator output, it is forwarded to HCE using UDP socket.
The rate and amount of data transfer from HCE and CCE and
their receiving ports are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
THE RATE AND AMOUNT OF DATA TRANSFER BETWEEN THE RELIABLE
AND NORMAL CONTROL ENVIRONMENTS.
Component Direction Rate Size Port
IMU HCE → CCE 250Hz 52 bytes 14660
Barometer HCE → CCE 50Hz 32 bytes 14660
GPS HCE → CCE 10Hz 44 bytes 14660
RC HCE → CCE 50Hz 50 bytes 14660
Motor Output CCE → HCE 400Hz 29 bytes 14600
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the experiments that demon-
strated the effectiveness of container-based framework against
different types of DoS attacks. All experiments are conducted
at the Intelligent Robotics Laboratory at the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. A Vicon motion capture system is
used to provide indoor positioning [22] for the prototype drone
such that it can fly autonomously in a controlled environment.
In all the experiments, the drone operator first flies the drone
to a safe height in manual mode and then switches to position
control mode, where the drone uses all sensor and localization
data to stabilize itself at a 3D set point in the space. The
drone’s Cartesian trajectory data along X, Y and Z axes are
used for analysis.
A. Container and VM overhead comparison
To show how lightweight the container implementation
is, we compare the CPU idle rates when running only one
container and virtual machine respectively on the host. The
container is configured as Section IV. The virtual machine
is created with QEMU [23] v3.0.0 and emulates an ARM
Versatile/PB (ARM926EJ-S) platform with 256MB memory.
In the virtual machine, we run the same Linux kernel image
as the host. As the results shown in Table II, the overhead of
running containers is closed to the native OS case and is much
lower than running VMs.
B. Memguard protect drone from memory DoS attack
The attacker can run a memory intensive process inside the
container to launch a memory DoS attack against the HCE. We
used the Bandwidth from Isolbench, a benchmark that reads
or writes a large array sequentially, to simulate the attacker’s
behavior. In this experiment, the Bandwidth task is the only
process running inside the container, as this allows it to utilize
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Fig. 4. Local position X, Y and
Z for the quadcopter without Mem-
Guard. The Bandwidth attack starts
at 10 seconds and the drone crashes
shortly after.
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Fig. 5. Local position X, Y and Z for
the quadcopter with MemGuard. The
drone oscillates but is still stable.
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Fig. 6. Local position X, Y and Z for
the quadcopter. The complex con-
troller is killed at 12 seconds. The
monitor switches the control back to
the safety controller to stabilize the
drone.
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Fig. 7. Local position X, Y and Z
for the quadcopter under UDP DoS
attack. The drone is able to recover
from unstable flight.
TABLE II
SYSTEM OVERHEAD COMPARISON.
Cases
Overhead #CPU
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 CPU3
No container nor VM 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
One VM 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.77
One container 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.98
all container resources exclusively and can maximize the
potential damage. The attacker launches the Bandwidth task
mid-fly and the performance of the drone is compared with
MemGuard enabled and turned off. The MemGuard budget for
the CCE is set to a value that allows the complex controller
to run without problem.
In the case without MemGuard, Figure 4, the drone starts to
drift right after the Bandwidth task is launched by the attacker
(at 15 seconds) and results in a crash shortly after. When the
MemGuard is enabled, as in Figure 5, the drone oscillates for
a short time but then managed to stabilize itself.
C. Security Monitoring defends UDP DoS attack
The attacker may use the UDP channel to initiate a DoS at-
tack against the HCE. To demonstrate this attack, we launched
a program mid-fly that continuously send packets to the UDP
port that the HCE is listening on.
The results are presented in Figure 7. After the program
starts at 8 seconds, the drone starts circling and the radius
gradually increases. Then attitude error control kicks in, killing
the receiving thread on HCE and switching the control to
safety controller, and brings the drone back to a stable state.
D. Security Monitoring defends safety attack
As the complex controller has potential vulnerabilities, the
attacker might choose to kill it to not only damage the
drone’s safety but also maximize the resource used for attack.
In this case, shown in Figure 6, the attacker shutdown the
complex controller while the drone is flying, at 12 seconds.
The security monitor detects that the output from CCE has not
been received for some time, then kills the receiving thread
and switches to the output from the safety controller, shown
in Figure 6.
VI. RELATED WORK
Container’s lightweight footprint makes it a potential can-
didate for running real-time applications. Mao et al. explored
using real-time container for Radio Access Networks (RANs)
to minimize the latencies in cloud network [24], and Masek
studied the performance overhead of using containers for
cyber-physical system application in [25]. However, they used
testing application to measure container latencies with a real-
time patch kernel but not running the actual program to be
used in the container.
For DoS attacks in embedded systems, Wood et al. studied
the defense mechanisms in each layer of a sensor network in
[26] and Raymond et al. [27] explored the defense mechanisms
in wireless network. These defense mechanisms focused more
on the security of different network layers. Chelladhurai et
al. proposed security algorithms and methods to address DoS
attacks related issues in the Docker container in [28]. The
goal is to protect the container from the attack coming from
the network, instead of securing the host applications of the
DoS attacks from the containers.
The Simplex Architecture [14], [29] has been used to
provide guarantees for systems that use unreliable control.
The System-Level Simplex [30] used hardware/software co-
design to achieve fault tolerance in the system level. Based
on this, Mohan et al. [31] used a combination of trusted
hardware and OS techniques to enhance the security and safety
of the real-time controller. The VirtualDrone [32] used the
virtual machine to implement the Simplex architecture and
provides attack-resilience for a range of attacks. However,
the high latency introduced by the virtual machine makes it
impossible to enforce more real-time resource control. The
Simplex architecture has also been implemented using two
heterogeneous hardware in [33]. However, they focus more
on software bugs and transient hardware faults.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a DoS attack-resilient control
framework, ContainerDrone, for real-time UAV system using
containers. It is composed of the verified HCE, which runs a
safety controller that implements only safety critical function-
alities, and the CCE that runs a complex controller with better
performance but is potentially unsafe. The framework protects
the HCE from the DoS attack launched inside the container
by limiting attacker’s access to three critical system resources:
CPU, memory, and communication channel. We implemented
the framework on a prototype quadcopter using RPi3B and the
open-source Docker container software. Through experiments,
we demonstrated the proposed framework can defend against
various types of DoS attack launched from CCE effectively.
In the future, we plan to provide hard real-time proof and
schedulability analysis for container drone and extend the
framework to other types of unmanned vehicles.
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